Although casualty figures are dispute, I’m willing to stick by the approximate number of 800. You can see the debate over the issue here: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/36645.html.

Moreover, the fact that none of the combatants wore uniforms certainly blurs the line between insurgents and civilians, but recall that under humanitarian law, in order for a civilian to lose that designation and become a combatant, they must directly participate in hostilities. In many instances, insurgents were blended into civilian populations within military targets. As likely as it is for insurgent groups to classify their combatants as civilians, Coalition forces are just as likely to classify occupants of a military target as insurgents. Though incidental deaths of civilians pursuant to the destruction of military targets is not a violation of humanitarian law, those civilian deaths are nonetheless attributable to military action. Simply because they were killed in a military action against a military target does not make them insurgents.

None of the combatants wore uniforms and many of those killed while fighting against the Americans were counted as civilian casualties by insurgent propagandists. It is true that the civilian population did not have an opportunity to flee prior to the April attack and many were caught in the crossfire.

http://www.fallujahbook.com

I beg to differ. The people of Fallujah were warned well in advance of the coming onslaught. 200,000 Fallujans packed up and left the city prior to the assault. While the attack was led by tanks, nearly all the Marine infantry entered Fallujah on foot (through minefields and IED laden streets).

In Fallujah, however, there was more reliance on artillery and air support than in Marjah.

As for setting up a new local government. The same was true in Fallujah. The return of civil authority to Fallujah was one of the little-known successes of the fight.

http://www.fallujahbook.com