United States Sanctions on Iran after the Nuclear Deal

The Iran Nuclear Arms Deal is a landmark, but this deal has been heavily criticized due to the United States economic penalties toward Iran. The circumstances in Iran has put the United States in a difficult situation as they have had to rely on sanctions to deter Iranian actions, but Iran has complied with the deal and expects more of an economic boom. This has led other countries in Europe and Asia uncertain whether to deal in legal business with Iran due to United States laws in sanctions and financial regulations.

The Iran Nuclear Deal stated that Iran would sacrifice two-thirds of its ability to enrich uranium, which is used to make the core of a nuclear bomb, and to be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[1] Iran would agree to IAEA inspectors monitoring its nuclear plants and other facilities. Once the IAEA has confirmed that Iran has taken these steps, America would lift nuclear-related economic sanctions.[2] These sanctions include oil embargos and financial restrictions.[3] By lifting these economic sanctions, it was estimated $100 billion of frozen Iranian assets would be released. Iran would remain subject to a United Nations arms embargo for five years.[4]

The United States government has engaged in foreign trade with Iran even though it has forbidden most American commerce with Iran.[5] The United States implements sanctions through the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).[6] These sanctions apply to United States companies, and anyone in the United States.[7] If companies in the Untied States were to trade with Iran they could be fined and prosecuted for civil violations that do not require a showing of intent or knowledge, and are punishable by heavy penalties.[8]

These sanctions and regulations have caused uncertainty for Asian and European government and companies doing legal business due to the fear of being prosecuted by the United States.[9] Since United States banks can not do business in Iran, there is a prohibition of transactions in dollars.[10] This is a large issue as it is a main business currency through the United States financial system.[11] This causes international banks hesitant in processing Iranian transactions, due to fear that the United States prosecuting these banks because of sanctions they have implemented in Iran.

Even though some sanctions have been lifted it is not clear what type of trading is still allowed with Iran.[12] Furthermore, Iran’s action in the area is seen as hostile. They continue to test ballistic missals.[13] The United States fears that these ballistic missals could be used one day to deliver a nuclear payload.[14] Even though these tests are not covered by the nuclear deal the United States has responded by placing sanctions on Iranian business and individuals but not on the nation.

United States sanctions upon Iran have caused fear of prosecution to business and banks that deal with Iran. This in some ways has caused Iran not to see the large economic boom they expected. Due to Iran’s continued ballistic testing in the area, and fear that these missals could one day carry a nuclear payload, the United States has sanctioned Iran even more. This causes the United States to be in a precarious situation as one of the reasons to the nuclear deal was to help Iran get its economy back on track, but at the same time the United States must implement sanctions on hostilities, and walking away from the deal would cause further destabilization in the area.


[1] David Blair, A Summary of the Iran Nuclear Deal, (Jul. 14, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/11739214/A-summary-of-the-Iran-nuclear-deal.html

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods with Iran, (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5070.html

[6] Alacra Compliance Primer, Enforcement Actions for U.S. Sanctions Violations Offer Lessons for Compliance, (Sept. 14, 2014), https://www.alacra.com/alacra/help/alacracomplianceprimer3.pdf

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Matthew Lee, Analysis: Iran Nuclear Deal Puts U.S. in Bind Amid Criticism, (Apr. 11, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/analysis-iran-nuclear-deal-puts-us-bind-amid-38301740


[10] PRESSTV, Banks still afraid of US fines to process Iran deals, (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/03/23/457187/Banks-still-afraid-of-US-fines-to-process-Iran-deals/

[11] Id.

[12] Tom Arnold and Jonathan Saul, Iranians Exasperated as U.S. sanctions frustrate deal making, (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-trade-finance-idUSKCN0WO1Y3

[13] Fox News, Iran to US: Missile Program “not open to negotiation,(Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/04/10/iran-says-missile-program-is-not-negotiable.html

[14] Id.

Sign Her Up? Women and Selective Service in a Post-Rostker v. Goldberg Era

The Selective Service System was first adopted in 1917 prior to the United States’ participation in World War I.[1] After the country experienced two global wars, the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) was reenacted in 1948 with the goal of maintaining America’s armed forces.[2] For the purpose of sustaining “adequate armed strength” to “insure the security of this Nation,” adult males are required to register for military service.[3] Given recent events taken by the Defense Secretary, the applicability of this statute may be extended to adult females as well.

In December 2015, Defense Secretary Carter opened up all military positions to women, including combat and special operations positions.[4] This historic move that is currently in the process of being implemented among America’s armed forces puts forth the question of whether all adult female citizens will be required to register for military service. This question had been answered in the past through Rostker v. Goldberg.[5]

This case was brought to the Supreme Court after plaintiffs, several men who were subject to registration and subsequent entry into the armed services, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of MSSA, particularly for the gender-based discrimination.[6] In 1980, the District Court found MSSA unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Utilizing the “important government interest” test from Craig v. Boren, the District Court struck down MSSA and held that having women registrants available would increase flexibility in the armed forces; thus, the court rejected Congress’ contention that registering women would result in “inconsistent positions.”[7]

The Supreme Court reached a different conclusion and reversed the District Court’s decision in 1981. Citing a Senate Report discussing the possibility of registering women, the Court reasoned that both Houses of Congress found that “[if] mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime scenario, the primary manpower need would be for combat replacements.”[8] Since women as a group were ineligible for combat positions, the exemption of women from registration in MSSA was deemed closely related to Congress’ purpose in authorizing and limiting registration to men, and did not violate the Due Process Clause.[9]

However, since all positions without exclusion are now available to women, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Rostker no longer applies. This opens up the possibility to require women to register like their male counterparts, and presents opportunities for women to participate in physically demanding positions, including infantry and Special Operations jobs like the Navy SEAL and Green Beret.[10] Although registration is merely the first step and does not necessarily mandate service, sending eighteen and twenty year old women into combat is an uncomfortable topic to talk about.[11]

Although the topic is difficult to discuss, key figures have spoken in the affirmative about requiring female citizens to register. General Mark Milley, chief of staff of the Army, and General Robert Neller, the Marine Corps commandant, stated that they were on board with the change during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing discussing the complete integration of women in the military on February 2, 2016.[12] Furthermore, the Defense Department intends on beginning associated changes in training and evaluation of women in combat roles by April 1 this year.

Needless to say, whether one sees this as a civic duty that women must fulfill or placing women in unnecessary danger, imposing a requirement for women in the United States to register would be significant moment in American military history.

[1] Dan Lamothe, Army and Marine Corps chiefs: It’s time for women to register for the draft, The Washington Post (February 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/02/02/army-and-marine-corps-chiefs-its-time-for-women-to-register-for-the-draft/

[2] Selective Service Act of 1948, Publ. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604 (1948).

[3] 50 U.S.C. § 3801 (2015).

[4] Supra Note 1.

[5] Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

[6] Id. at 61.

[7] Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (quoting Reed v. Reed which held that in order to withstand constitutional challenge “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve those objectives”); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 63.

[8] Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-826, at 160 (1980)).

[9] Id. at 77-79.

[10] Supra note 1.

[11] Dan Lamothe, There’s a rift opening on how the U.S. should handle women and military drafts, The Washington Post (February 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/02/05/theres-a-rift-opening-on-how-the-u-s-should-handle-women-and-military-drafts/?tid=sm_tw

[12] Supra note 1.

iConstitution: How Apple is using the Constitution as a basis for its argument against the FBI

It’s quite difficult to imagine exactly what the Framers of the Constitution would think of the construal of their document to protect the locked-away iMessages and data of the San Bernardino terrorists. Yet, the principles of the Constitution that Apple is using to rebut the arguments of the FBI protect the rights of the individual to privacy and due process in a succinct and powerful manner.[i]

Primarily at play are the First and Fifth Amendments, but Apple also relies upon an argument against the All Writs Act of 1789.[ii] The FBI is using the All Writs Act as its source of authority for the court order compelling Apple to create a new version of its operating system that would make it easier to access the iPhone’s password-protected data.[iii] Apple fears that the creation of such software would not only threaten the privacy of all Apple users, but would also place an undue burden on the company to either destroy the program after the FBI uses it or keep and protect it against the certain multitude of attempts by “criminals, terrorists, and hackers” to steal the software. [iv]

Apple’s First Amendment argument relies upon the established classification of computer code as speech.[v] The First Amendment, as it pertains to this issue, prohibits the making of any law abridging free speech.[vi] In this instance Apple argues that its interests are protected because the Supreme Court has clearly decided that First Amendment protections apply when the government attempts to compel speech.[vii] Apple cites Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., which upholds the idea that the court must scrutinize attempts by the government to compel speech, and it will be allowed only when the request is of a scope narrow enough to obtain a compelling state interest.[viii] The FBI, Apple argues, does not meet this standard because it has produced nothing more than mere speculation of potentially relevant information on the phone.[ix] Further, any relevant information may be encrypted using non-Apple software in secure communication applications.[x]

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is applied in an attempt to protect Apple from governmental conscription.[xi] The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states, “[n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law…”[xii]Apple argues that a court order compelling the company to create a backdoor that unlocks the San Bernardino terrorists’ phone violates its Due Process because the government would be depriving Apple of its liberty.[xiii] The government cannot force a private company to perform actions that are excessively burdensome and “contrary to the company’s core principles,” and Apple contends that the FBI’s request that Apple creates software that allows access to this iPhone cannot succeed due to this protection.[xiv]

With respect to the FBI’s use of the All Writs Act, Apple maintains that the FBI’s order violates the two requirements developed through common law that are pursuant to all orders.[xv] The Act requires that orders “must not adversely affect the basic interests of the third party or impose an undue burden.”[xvi] Apple alleges that the FBI’s order fails the first requirement because it has a powerful interest in protecting its security systems and all Apple customers depend on the company for their privacy.[xvii] The FBI’s order fails the second requirement too, argues Apple, because Apple would be forced to create a program that undermines the security features the company spent years developing.[xviii] Further, if Apple is compelled to create such software, it would open the floodgates to a large number of parties seeking similar software.[xix] Apple would be forced to either build and destroy software for each phone they are compelled to break open or safeguard the software against certain numerous attacks by parties with dubious intentions, both of which are alleged to be an undue burden on the company.[xx]

Apple presents itself as the hero of the rights of private companies to protect personal privacy against valid governmental concerns. The company does not seek to negate the FBI’s need to access the San Bernardino terrorists’ iPhone data, but rather hopes to preserve and protect the rights of individuals at the cost of burdening the government. Apple’s reliance on integral amendments to the Constitution serve to bolster its stance and prove that though dated, the Constitution’s elasticity allows its application to the technological intricacies of the current times. The argument is powerful, but the FBI’s reliance upon the All Writs Act and public safety concerns may outweigh Apple’s protection of privacy.


[i] Apple Inc.’s Mot. to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, and Opposition to Govt.’s Mot. to Compel Assistance, 32:5.

[ii] Id.; Id. at 14:13,14.

[iii] Id. at 14:13,14.

[iv] Id. at 25:6-9.

[v] Id. at 32:15,16 (citing sources that treat computer code as speech under the First Amendment).

[vi] U.S. Const. amend. I.

[vii] Mot. to Vacate, 32:21,22.

[viii] Id. at 32:22-6 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,796 (1988)).

[ix] Id. at 33:3-6.

[x] Id. at 33:8-10.

[xi] Id. at 34:10,11.

[xii] U.S. Const. amend. V.

[xiii] Mot. to Vacate, 34:14-17 (citing Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010).

[xiv] Id.

[xv] Id. at 23:8,9 (citing United States v. Hall, 582 F. Supp. 717, 719 (E.D. Va. 1984).

[xvi] Id.

[xvii] Id. at 23:11-16.

[xviii] Id. at 23:20-22.

[xix] Id. at 24:6-8.

[xx] Id. at 24:17-19, 25:1,2.




Cyber Security Threats Offer New Legal Challenge to Holding Spies Responsible for Espionage

In December 2014, naturalized US citizen Mostafa Ahmed Awwad was arrested by the FBI for attempting to sell blueprints of the US Navy’s brand-new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford.[1] Awwad, a former Egyptian citizen and engineer in the Nuclear Engineering and Planning Department of the massive Norfolk Naval Shipyard, had a Secret security clearance and access to sensitive blueprints of the most advanced ship ever designed.[2] The case against Awwad is pretty cut-and-dry. Believing he was corresponding with an Egyptian Intelligence officer, Awwad turned over computer-aided drawings of the aircraft carrier, wore a pinhole camera in sensitive areas of the shipyard to record restricted information, and acknowledged that the information he provided would be sent to Egypt for use.[3] With the details of this case reading like a Cold War spy thriller, complete with dead-drops, spy gadgets, and a discreet payment left in a hole under a park bench in Southeast Virginia, the “Egyptian Intelligence officer” that Awwad was corresponding with was actually an undercover FBI agent.[4] Awwad was arrested, charged with attempted espionage, and recently sentenced to eleven years in federal prison.[5]

Modern-day espionage cases have all resulted in similar responses from the FBI and Department of Justice: arrest, try, and sentence. From Robert Hanssen to John Walker and Mostafa Ahmed Awwad, when suspected spies are caught, they’re tried and held responsible for their acts.[6] But how does our justice system’s response to espionage change when the actors are not physically within our country when they’re spying? What about when the secrets that are stolen are taken over the internet?

US defense contractors spend billions of dollars every year on research and development to design and build the most sophisticated and advanced military equipment in the world. The USS Gerald R. Ford, for instance, will cost nearly $13 billion to design and build once complete.[7] Similarly, the US military’s brand new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has taken nearly twenty years and $400 billion to design and build, and its state of the art technology is more advanced than any other fighter jet ever built.[8] Coincidentally, shortly after its debut, China unveiled its new J-31 fighter jet, which strikingly resembles the F-35 in its design and performance characteristics.[9] The similarities, revealed to be from a 2007 data breach of US defense contractor Lockheed Martin’s computer servers by Chinese hackers, represent, “the greatest transfer of wealth in history,” and extend to include over fifty-terabytes of sensitive military weapon systems data—including the AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense Radar System, and the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship.[10]

This new form of digital-espionage leaves the US in unchartered territory. Can the US treat these breaches the same way as traditional espionage cases? Is it even possible to hold faceless hackers halfway across the globe accountable under the US criminal justice system? Furthermore, how is the dynamic changed when the hacker is an individual activist (or hacktivist) versus a nation?

Judging by the Department of Defense’s initially tacit response to the massive hacks, and only fully revealed to the public after documents released by Edward Snowden detailed the theft, policy-makers, defense leaders, and the law enforcement community do not want to publicly define these acts because doing so would tie their hands in their response. While on the surface these two different forms of espionage yield similar results (i.e. sensitive military and intelligence information in the hands of our adversaries), the complexities of holding the perpetrators responsible are worlds apart.

Furthermore, the question remains of where the line is drawn between espionage or something more. The 2014 Chinese hacks on the personnel and security clearance databases of the Office of Personnel Management went beyond the previous breaches of military technology.[11] Exposing over 22 million Americans’ social security numbers and personal life details, the hacks could have a very real, though likely not kinetic, effect on the lives of the US citizens whose information was stolen.[12]  By not defining these hacks or drawing any clear lines, the US retains the ability to choose how to best respond, and whether or not to make these responses public. Taking a hard line would tie the country’s hand whenever a breach occurs and could escalate a situation beyond the scope of the original act.


[1] Howell, Kellan. “FBI Charges Saudi-born Naval Engineer over Plans to Sink Aircraft Carrier.” The Washington Times 06 Dec. 2014. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[2] Zapotosky, Matt. “Navy Engineer Admits Trying to Leak Plans for New Aircraft Carrier to Egypt.” The Washington Post 15 June 2015. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[3] Cavas, Christopher P. “Navy Engineer Indicted for Trying to Sell Secrets.” Navy Times 05 Dec. 2014. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[4] Id.

[5] FBI. “Navy Civilian Engineer Sentenced to 11 Years for Attempted Espionage.” FBI 2015. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[6] FBI. “Counterintelligence Cases Past and Present.” FBI 2013. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[7] Harper, Jon. “Funding Restricted for Ford-Class Carriers.” National Defense Magazine Sept. 2015. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[8] Wall Street Journal. “China’s Cyber-Theft Jet Fighter.” The Wall Street Journal 12 Nov. 2014. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[9] Goldstein, Sarah. “Snowden: Chinese Hackers Stole F-35 Fighter Jet Blueprints.” New York Daily News 20 Jan. 2015. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[10] Russian Today. “50 Terabytes! Snowden Leak Reveals Massive Size of F-35 Blueprints Hack by China.” Russian Today 19 Jan. 2015. Web. 13 Nov. 2015.

[11] Nakashima, Ellen. “Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People, Federal Authorities Say.” The Washington Post 09 Jul. 2015. Web. 14 Nov. 2015.

[12] Id.

NATO Article V and the United States’ Role in the Aftermath of the Paris Terror Attacks

Following the chaos and tragedy of the recent Paris terror attacks, geopolitical developments are sure to have massive implications in the fight against the Islamic State. French President François Hollande promptly declared the attack “an act of war”, and has coordinated with Russia to launch an extensive bombing campaign against ISIL targets in Syria. However, Hollande has yet to invoke Article V of the NATO charter, nor has indicated any plans to do so. There has been prolonged debate as to whether NATO should play military role in the fight against ISIL, and if so to what extent. Article V, a core tenant of the North Atlantic Treaty that created NATO in 1949, provides that an attack on one NATO member “shall be considered an attack against them all” and that each ally member “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking . . . action as it deems necessary.” [1] If France does decide to invoke Article V, the question then becomes what role does the twenty-eight-member organization take in the battle against the Islamic State, and more specifically how will the United States’ role be required to change, if at all?

Although the collective defense principle is a vital tenant of NATO’s mission, Article V has only been invoked once in the organization’s sixty-year history; by the United States on September 12, 2001, following the September 11th Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. [2] While France decides whether to enlist NATO assistance by means of Article V, it could also first invoke Article IV, which provides that “[t]he Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” [3] Article IV has been invoked four times throughout NATO’s history, most recently by Turkey following ISIL terror attacks in Suroc on July 6, 2015. [4] The purpose of Article IV is for the North Atlantic Council to decide whether to invoke Article V, or in lieu of Article V what political, economic, and military strategies to implement. [5] If the North Atlantic Council should decide to invoke Article V, all NATO countries would be obligated to treat the Paris attack as if it had occurred on their own soil, and treat it as an act of war.

At first blush, France invoking Article V would appear to run contrary to President Obama’s current strategy regarding ISIL, as he most recently stated that committing a large number of ground troops in the Middle East would be a mistake. [6] However, because the language of Article V is purposefully vague as to allow countries to contribute as they see fit, France invoking Article V would most likely not drastically change the current US policy. During the original drafting of Article V, there was unanimous agreement on the principle of collective defense, but a fundamental disagreement on how to implement it. [7] The European signatories wanted to ensure that the United States would automatically come to their assistance should one of them come under attack by the Soviet Union or a Soviet-proxy, while the United States did not want to make such a compulsory military agreement. [8] The United States ultimately succeeded in the framing Article V as necessarily broad in order to provide military assistance and intelligence without committing active ground troops. Thus, with or without an Article V invocation, the Obama Administration’s position of increased intelligence sharing with the French and air strikes would most likely be unaltered.

Former NATO commander James Stavridis recently wrote in Foreign Policy that France should invoke Article V, and that NATO should take a leading role in the fight against ISIL. Among several military suggestions, Stavridis said NATO should take the leading role from the United States in organizing a comprehensive training mission including the Kurdish Peshmerga-Yazidi force operating in northern Iraq and the Iraqi security forces in Baghdad. [9] Stavridis also argued for an open coalition in which Arab partners could join the coalition, but would be subject to NATO chain of command. [10]

France’s reluctance to invoke NATO assistance presents novel problems moving forward. First, what does France’s cooperation with Vladimir Putin and the Russians, a traditional NATO adversary and current aggressor in Ukraine, signify about the sovereignty of NATO’s collective defense principle? This is especially disconcerting in light of the recent Russian intrusions into Turkish air space and actions in Ukraine that have prompted discussion of invoking NATO action against Russia. [11] Second, what is NATO’s broader role in the fight against the Islamic State?

The United States’ actions moving forwards could have large implications for these questions and the weight of an invocation of Article V. Florida Senator and Republican presidential candidate Marco Rubio recently stated that France should invoke Article V, and that the United States should upscale its military operations in Syria in coordination with the French and NATO forces. [12] Former Florida governor and GOP presidential candidate Jeb Bush stopped short of calling for an Article V invocation, he did say Article IV should be invoked so the North Atlantic Council could discuss an integrated strategy moving forward. [13] The question is sure to to be raised to presidential candidates from both parties in the coming weeks and months leading up to the election.

Current events have illustrated that the current geopolitical context in which NATO is operating under is murky and unclear. If Stavridis’ approach is taken, it could signify a resurgence of NATO as a primary fighting force in the global war on terror, much like it was in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. However, under the current constraints and conditions, NATO’s role in the fight against the Islamic State and its broader geopolitical role in the 21st Century appears ambiguous.





1 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.

2 Collective Defence, Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 16 Nov. 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm?selectedLocale=en

3 North Atlantic Treaty art. 4, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.

4 The Consultation Process and Article 4, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 28 July 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm

5 Id.

6 President Barack Obama, Press Conference in Antalya, Turkey (16 Nov. 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/press-conference-president-obama-antalya-turkey

7 See Collective Defence, supra note 2.

8 See id.

9 James Stavridis, NATO’s Turn to Attack, Foreign Policy, 14 Nov. 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/14/natos-turn-to-attack-paris-terrorist-isis/

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Anna L. Sussman, Marco Rubio on Paris Attacks: “We should Invoke Article V”, W.S.J., 15 Nov. 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/11/15/marco-rubio-on-paris-attacks-we-should-invoke-article-5/

13 Ilya Somin, Using Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to Legalize the War with ISIS, Wash. Post, 15 Nov. 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/11/15/using-article-5-of-the-nato-treaty-to-legalize-the-war-against-isis/