The No-Fly List in addition to another related list – the Selectee List and together the “watchlists” – were created in mid-December 2001. The No-Fly List includes individuals who may not receive a boarding pass for a flight to, from, over, or within the United States; individuals on the Selectee List are stopped and subject to additional security screenings before determinations of eligibility of boarding pass are made.[4] Originally, there were 594 named individuals on the No-Fly List and 365 on the Selectee List.[5] Although the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration officials at airports and other ports of entry use the lists, the data is obtained from and managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), administered by the FBI. According to the Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS), additions to and removals from both lists are based on requests and information from federal law enforcement or other federal intelligence agencies.[6] On average 1,000 changes are made daily to the U.S. watchlists.[7] The two primary criteria for determining addition are whether the individual presents a threat to civil aviation and whether there is sufficient unclassified biographical data to ensure proper identification.[8]

After the failed 2009 attempt referenced above, government officials sought to make “strong improvements” on the “watchlisting process.”[9] Among the changes was the implementation of a new criterion that a person does not have to be considered only a threat to aviation to be placed on the list.[10] Under the new lowered standard, an individual need be considered a threat, broadly construed, to national or international security in order to be placed on the list. Last month, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) documented the experiences of the list’s “latest targets,” two Muslim men of Libyan origin who were living in Portland, Oregon and traveled to Libya after Qaddafi’s fall, one to visit family and another with a Oregon relief agency to perform humanitarian work.[11] When they tried to return home to the U.S., both were barred from doing so: one was subjected to a lie detector test and told that the officers were “convinced of his guilt” and specifically mentioned his discussing Sharia with other Muslims – “an indicator of criminal wrongdoing.” The other was detained and jailed for two days in London. CAIR asserts that the U.S. has effectively removed the rational basis criteria for placement on the list – namely the “derogatory” information available on the individual[12] – resulting in its dramatic ballooning. Additionally, through requests for legal assistance CAIR has compiled some indicators on how the new standard is being applied, with federal agencies flagging individuals who serve Muslim populations as aid workers to those with mere social or professional relationships with other Muslims, findings that CAIR deems are, in effect, punishment for association and for being Muslim.[13]

Apart from these indicators, the secrecy of the list as well as the lack of notice to individuals placed on the list has already given rise to several lawsuits, including a successful petition by Ms. Rahinah Ibrahim, a Malaysian woman of Muslim faith and a doctoral student at Stanford before the proceeding with no criminal record or ties to terrorism. Ibrahim sued the government in Ibrahim v. Dept. of Homeland Security, challenging her inclusion on the No-Fly List when she was arrested before a flight to Malaysia to visit family. Her inclusion was used to revoke her student visa and prohibit her from completing her degree.[14] The District Court dismissed her case on the ground that federal law prescribes that all challenges to TSA orders to be filed directly in a federal appeals court where there is no right to a jury or discovery.[15] However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that federal district court judges could hear challenges to the No-Fly List because the names are maintained by the TSC and, as a division of the FBI, it is not covered under the same statute as procedures for challenging the TSA.[16] Since that decision in 2008, the ACLU also filed suit in 2010 on behalf of fifteen U.S. nationals, some of whom are Muslims, challenging their No-Fly List inclusion asserting that they have not been told why they are on the list or given a meaningful chance to contest their inclusion.[17]

While Ibrahim v. Dept. of Homeland Securitypresents a benchmark for Muslim civil liberties in particular, the standards for placement on the No-Fly and Selectee Lists must become clearer and require more stringent proof of a suspicion of terrorist affiliation before an individual is included. Failure to do so will only serve to further isolate American Muslims, the community that has been the most negatively impacted by discriminatory application of the new criterion. As the severe consequences of inclusion include curtailing liberty and freedom of movement and as relief for the innocent is expensive and time-consuming if ever procured, all involved government agencies must take immediate steps to reduce costly errors in the continued development and ongoing maintenance of the watchlists.

What is it?

The governing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a), defines economic espionage as the stealing, conveying, or accepting of trade secrets, “intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.” Individual violators of § 1831 are punishable up to $500,000 and 15 years in prison and organizations are punishable up to $10 million. “Trade Secrets,” are defined in § 1839 as any information where the owner of the information has taken measures to keep it secret and the information derives independent economic value from being unknown or easily accessible.

President Clinton stated upon signing the 1996 EEA, the Act ameliorated the “antiquated laws that have not kept pace with the technological advances of modern society.” In a hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, expert in the field R.J. Hefferman commented on the “antiquated” laws the President referred to, saying that prior to the EEA, the law was simply, “sufficient to prosecute most thefts of corporate property because most corporate property was tangible.” The relevant statute before 1996 was 18 U.S.C. § 1905, the Trade Secrets Act, which did not apply to private sector employees and provided only minor sanctions.  Hefferman continued, “Likewise, national security laws were sufficient to prosecute theft of classified government information.” In United States v. Hsu, the court further pointed out the other relevant statutes before 1996 were, “drafted at a time when computers, biotechnology, and copy machines did not even exist and industrial espionage often occurred without the use of mail or wire.” (Internal quotations omitted).

Even in 1996 enough corporate property had shifted from material to intangible that the necessity for new legislation was clear. Hefferman points out a 323% increase in intangible property from 1982-1992, putting the annual losses to American industry at $24 billion in 1996. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh noted that at the time the EEA was passed, “eight foreign countries have been ‘extremely active’ in using bribery, theft, and other techniques to provide trade secrets to domestic companies,” and the FBI was investigating at one point more than 800 cases of economic espionage.

Why does it matter?

Earlier this year in a report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper had focused the list to China, Russia, and Iran as areas of major concern in this field. Director Clapper warned that the growing practice and reliance on cloud data processing and storage coupled with the “dramatic rise and increase in depth and complexity” of these nations will make this issue a prominent one in the immediate future. He also noted that, “owing to market incentives, innovation in functionality is outpacing innovation in security, and neither the public nor private sector has been successful at fully implementing existing best practices.” Additionally the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission published a detailed report with Northrop Grumman which stated that the Chinese, “have adopted a formal Information Warfare strategy called ‘Integrated Network Electronic Warfare’ that consolidates the offensive mission for both computer network attack and Electronic Warfare under the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department’s the Department of Electronic Countermeasures.”

What’s wrong with the current situation?

The public and private sectors are at odds with who should be responsible for the prosecution and realistically the implementation of the EEA. The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) stated, “The private sector alone lacks the resources and expertise to thwart foreign efforts to steal critical American know-how. This is in large part because counterintelligence is not a typical corporate function, even for well-trained and well–staffed security professionals.” Juxtapose with this statement from a corporate crisis management firm: “Economic espionage must be fought in the trenches one company at a time, and it is incumbent upon all at-risk companies to take steps to identify and protect important trade secrets and other intellectual property.” Whether there is a viable efficient solution remains to be seen, but presently this intersection between corporate and national security interests will continue to encourage progress.

What does the future look like?

The future must be a coordinated effort from both the public and private entities of the United States. The FBI lists six steps for businesses to help in the effort to protect the nation from economic espionage: 1. Recognize there is an insider and outsider threat to your company. 2. Identify and valuate trade secrets. 3. Implement a proactive plan for safeguarding trade secrets. 4. Secure physical and electronic versions of your trade secrets. 5. Confine intellectual knowledge on a “need-to-know” basis. 6. Provide training to employees about your company’s intellectual property plan and security. Clearly this is the first echelon of defense and the FBI and broader Intelligence Community seems to be committed to this prevalent aspect of national security. As the NCIX 2009 Strategy states, “the counterintelligence community must act jointly to understand, confound, manipulate, and thwart these threats, which exceed the ability or resources of any single U.S. agency or department to overcome. When necessary, we will disrupt these activities through arrest and expulsion.” As recent as December 2011, Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Lanny A. Breuer reported the conviction and 87 month prison sentence of Kexue Huang for, “stealing valuable trade secrets from two American companies and disseminat[ing] them to individuals in Germany and China.” United States strategy will likely continue to evolve and adapt to the changing threat of economic espionage, and it will take increased cooperation between the Intelligence Community and public sector. American strategy may well be summed up by General Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, USMC: “We’re surrounded. That simplifies our problem.”

While there has been wide support for this program from both Republicans and Democrats alike, President Obama’s latest proposed budget for 2013 is cutting much of the funding for the program. “As recently as last March, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano voiced support for the program, agreeing with Rep. Chip Cravaack, R-Minnesota, a former airline pilot and FFDO, that it was a vital part of the country’s layer defenses.”

This program received $25 million in the 2012 budget but under the proposed 2013 budget, the funding was cut in half, down to $12 million. The program currently costs $15 per flight for an armed pilot. This program is much cheaper to administer than the Federal Air Marshall Service which currently has a budget of $964 million. Under the 2013 budget, the Federal Air Marshall Service also suffered a cut of 4%, equaling $927 million. This cut was justified because of “efficiencies and program changes that leverage other aviation security system enhancements, allowing for more efficient mission deployments focused on high-risk flights”.

This is a shocking cut to many in the aviation field and security proponents because it was known to be a quite popular, effective and rather safe program which was an efficient use personnel and funds. This program acted as a substitute to a Federal Marshall on-board a flight but this program offered a wider array of flights the safety and protection that an armed pilot offers against the fear of hijacking by terrorists. This severe cut in the program’s budget sends a message to not only pilots but the American people that the safety of flights is not important enough to allocate an adequate budget to run the program effectively. Hopefully President Obama will reconsider this budget cut before his final budget goes into effect for 2013.

To read more about the cuts in the Flight Deck Officer Program, go to: http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/13/us/budget-cuts-armed-pilots/index.html

Picture from:
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/01/armed-airline-pilots-want-authority-beyond-cockpit/

Come join the American University Washington College of Law National Security Law Brief on April 5, 2012 at 12 PM to explore the rapidly evolving and highly controversial area of material support statutes.

Keynote Speaker: Professor David Cole, Georgetown Law

To register please go to the following address: www.wcl.american.edu/secle/registration

For more information see this pdf.

To register for the event or for more information follow thing link: http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2012/20120405.cfm

First, some background. Anwar Al-Awlaki was killed Friday, September 30, 2011 presumably by a hellfire missile fired from a UAV. His death sparked a controversy because he was (1) killed in Yemen, which is not necessarily a theater of war under the AUMF; (2) was a member of AQAP, which is not necessarily “associated forces” under the AUMF; and most importantly, (3) he was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico making him a full citizen of the United States and protected by the Constitution’s command for Due Process. These questions all assumed another yet unanswered one: was Al-Awlaki truly a belligerent with malicious intentions against the United States or merely a “noxious propagandist?”

The Obama Administration first claimed victory and then claimed that they had a perfectly reasonable legal rationale for why the assignation was proper under International and Domestic law. They have never released that rationale, contained in a memo from the Office of Legal Counsel.

Fast forward to February 10, 2012. Umar Forouok Abdulmutalla (The Underwear Bomber) plead guilty and was sentenced to life in prison on February 17, 2012. During the sentencing process, the Department of Justice prepared for the court a sentencing memo. In the “Factual Appendix” to that memo, at pages 12-14, we learn more about Al-Awlaki’s operational role in AQAP:

“Once in Yemen, defendant visited mosques and asked people he met if they knew how he could meet Awlaki. Eventually, defendant made contact with an individual who in turn made Awlaki aware of defendant’s desire to meet him. Defendant provided this individual with the number for his Yemeni cellular telephone. Thereafter, defendant received a text message from Awlaki telling defendant to call him, which defendant did. During their brief telephone conversation, it was agreed that defendant would send Awlaki a written message explaining why he wanted to become involved in jihad. Defendant took several days to write his message to Awlaki, telling him of his desire to become involved in jihad, and seeking Awlaki’s guidance. After receiving defendant’s message, Awlaki sent defendant a response, telling him that Awlaki would find a way for defendant to become involved in jihad.

Thereafter, defendant was picked up and driven through the Yemeni desert. He eventually arrived at Awlaki’s house, and stayed there for three days. During that time, defendant met with Awlaki and the two men discussed martyrdom and jihad. Awlaki told defendant that jihad requires patience but comes with many rewards. Defendant understood that Awlaki used these discussions to evaluate defendant’s commitment to and suitability for jihad. Throughout, defendant expressed his willingness to become involved in any mission chosen for him, including martyrdom – and by the end of his stay, Awlaki had accepted defendant for a martyrdom mission.

Defendant left Awlaki’s house, and was taken to another house, where he met AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Al Asiri. Defendant and Al Asiri discussed defendant’s desire to commit an act of jihad. Thereafter, Al Asiri discussed a plan for a martyrdom mission with Awlaki, who gave it final approval, and instructed Defendant Abdulmutallab on it. For the following two weeks, defendant trained in an AQAP camp, and received instruction in weapons and indoctrination in jihad. During his time in the training camp, defendant met many individuals, including Samir Khan

Ibrahim Al Asiri constructed a bomb for defendant’s suicide mission and personally delivered it to Defendant Abdulmutallab. This was the bomb that defendant carried in his underwear on December 25, 2009. Al Asiri trained defendant in the use of the bomb, including by having defendant practice the manner in which the bomb would be detonated; that is, by pushing the plunger of a syringe, causing two chemicals to mix, and initiating a fire (which would then detonate the explosive).

Awlaki told defendant that he would create a martyrdom video that would be used after the defendant’s attack. Awlaki arranged for a professional film crew to film the video. Awlaki assisted defendant in writing his martyrdom statement, and it was filmed over a period of two to three days.The full video was approximately five minutes in length.

Although Awlaki gave defendant operational flexibility, Awlaki instructed defendant that

the only requirements were that the attack be on a U.S. airliner, and that the attack take place over U.S. soil. Beyond that, Awlaki gave defendant discretion to choose the flight and date. Awlaki instructed defendant not to fly directly from Yemen to Europe, as that could attract suspicion. As a result, defendant took a circuitous route, traveling from Yemen to Ethiopia to Ghana to Nigeria to Amsterdam to Detroit. Prior to defendant’s departure from Yemen, Awlaki’s last instructions to him were to wait until the airplane was over the United States and then to take the plane down

That may not be wholly satisfactory (maybe it is, since none of the usual suspects are saying anything) it is certainly something more concrete. Whether this increases calls for the Administration to answer all of the remaining legal questions, or not, remains to be seen.

With the downsizing of theUSpresence in theMiddle Eastbusinesses are turning technologies that were designed for war and finding new uses for it at home. One of the technologies that is particularly useful but also troublesome from a privacy point of view is the use of synthetic aperture radar (or SAR) which has been used to search for terrorists but also has implications for law enforcement and other mapping uses domestically. SAR uses radar waves and antenna to see in complete darkness, through rain, snow, clouds, and even foliage. SAR is generally used to map terrain. UAVs armed with SAR technology, for example, can find a marijuana field or a fugitive on the run.

While the Supreme Court recently ruled in US v. Jones that long-term GPS surveillance of a suspect required a warrant, the court was narrow enough in its ruling that other modern technologies used for surveillance is an open question. The court’s reasoning, as Scalia’s dissenting opinion points out, largely ignored the technology itself (the GPS) but attached great significance to the methodology (attaching the GPS to the suspect’s car to track where he went).  The “open fields doctrine” however still stands. This doctrine, very simply, is that what you do in the open, that can be seen from the air, with or without a fence or other obstacles, is not private and therefore not a protected privacy interest under the law. A scenario recently depicted in a LA Times article where local law enforcement used a drone to track down three suspects is becoming the norm. Another use is for businesses such as real estate brokers using them to photograph properties, or farmers using UAVs to dust crops with fertilizer. Some point to their possible future use for emergency evacuations both on the battlefield and in a natural disaster. There are also uses for movies and TV shows to have easy access to aerial views for a scene.

Proponents say that drones or UAVs are a great invention that should be harnessed to its fullest potential in both the business and the law enforcement world. UAVs are quieter (than conventional aircraft), require zero manpower, can fly non-stop, fly longer and can be flown undetected and without interference with commercial aircraft. Skeptics point to the very real danger of constant and preventative surveillance. There is a real concern about the lack of legislation and limitations around such surveillance. This is a technology that is moving faster than our laws are prepared for and it opens up questions about privacy, safety, probable cause, and government intrusion.

While the Federal Aviation Administration has controls over flight space and has some limitations in place, like flying below 400 feet, such limitations may be next to impossible to enforce with an emerging technology that the average person can build themselves. See http://diydrones.com/. Also, there is an emerging technology for micro aerial vehicles (MAVs), surveillance vehicles so small that it can take off and land in the palm of an operator’s hands. Countries such as theU.S.,Great Britain,Korea, andIsrael are in the race to develop and utilize MAVs. Once such example is the Black Widow MAV, weighing only 2 ounces and with a small 6 inch wingspan has been developed by AeroVironment. The difficult question of how to regulate and enforce regulations on something the size of a pencil has yet to be determined but will certainly need to be addressed sooner rather than later. Something that is clear is that there are serious privacy and security concerns that warrant great scrutiny considering the competing interests at stake. This will require thinking outside the normal legal framework of property and trespass theories and perhaps even traditional theories on what constitutes a search.  There will need to be careful balancing between the need and desire to utilize the technology for commercial and law enforcement purposes with private citizen’s expectations and the potential abuse and infringement on private rights that such technology threatens.

Sources:

• http://www.theuav.com/index.html
• http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/spiesfly/uavs.html
• http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/new-eyes-sky-protecting-privacy-domestic-drone-surveillance
• http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/10/nation/la-na-drone-arrest-20111211
• http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-warrants-needed-in-gps-tracking/2012/01/23/gIQAx7qGLQ_story.html
• http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-06/unmanned-drones-share-faa-airspace/52994752/1
• http://www.npr.org/2012/02/03/146350507/drone-technology-reaches-new-heights

Picture:

• http://sitelife.aviationweek.com/ver1.0/Content/images/store/5/0/255e6884-db3b-4070-a04d-a3c73c0bd00c.Full.jpg

The NYPD only has jurisdiction over Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island. Syracuse and Buffalo are not within its jurisdiction, and clearly, neither are Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. By investigating groups outside of its jurisdiction – particularly outside the state – the NYPD infringed on other states’ sovereign ability to pursue their own counter-terrorism methods. The sovereignty of each state to implement its own laws is one of the fundamental principles of our federalist system of government, and so by monitoring the activities of college students outside of its jurisdiction, the NYPD violated the U.S. Constitution, in addition toNew York law.

Within its jurisdiction, however, the NYPD’s actions still raise many questions. At first glance, they seem to be legal. After all, monitoring students at schools within New York Citycan help the NYPD prevent terrorism. Police spokesman Paul Browne reminded the AP that at least twelve people arrested for terrorism charges over the past five years were part of Muslim student organizations. The 2007 police report also mentioned the power that the Internet had over young Muslims in homegrown terrorist plots in both the United States and Europe, and highlighted the importance of preventing such actions from happening again. Furthermore, these actions do not seem to violate the Fourth Amendment, which protects the public from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are reasonable if they do not invade a generally accepted right to privacy. Because the NYPD maintains that it only monitored websites and other publicly available information, it did not invade such an accepted right to privacy. Thus, it appears at first glance that the NYPD’s actions are within the government’s power to prevent terrorism.

However, the monitoring implicates both First and Fourteenth Amendment concerns. Under the First Amendment, the members of these Muslim student associations, like all US citizens, have the right to freely practice their religion. The Supreme Court has consistently held that it will only uphold restrictions on a U.S. citizen’s First Amendment rights in dire situations, such as actual threats to the country or public safety. In this situation, there is no evidence that these student groups were making any kind of threats. In fact, comments on a blog post after a small plane crashed on 72^nd street in New York in 2006 expressly offered “thanks to God that the crash was only an accident and not an act of terrorism.” When police traveled with a group upstate on a rafting trip, the only observation they made was that the students prayed five times a day, as do all Muslims. Thus, the NYPD was not monitoring the groups for threats, but only because the members practiced Islam. Once the student groups found out about the monitoring, many of them expressed outrage, fear, and disgust. One member said he feels the need to constantly be on alert. Such a feeling is not conducive to the free exercise of religion or the free exercise of the right to assemble with like-minded individuals. Thus, the police monitoring puts a damper on two of the most fundamental rights of American citizens.

In addition, these actions likely violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents states from denying citizens the equal protection of federal law. There is no evidence that the NYPD monitored the actions of non-Muslim student groups. Thus, the police, and therefore the state ofNew York, treated the First Amendment rights of these particular students differently than other students simply because they happened to be Muslim. The Fourteenth Amendment purports to create the same rights and the same burdens for all citizens. By denying a group of citizens the same protection of the laws,New York violated their Constitutional right to equal protection.

Despite the Constitutional problems, these actions clearly tread into murky waters. The government has a duty and a right to prevent terrorism and keep the country safe. The Patriot Act granted the federal government permission to take any necessary steps to effect the country’s safety.  While the NYPD is not part of the federal government, it was acting on a mandate from the FBI, and so falls under the Patriot Act’s jurisdiction. In Title I, Section 102 of the Patriot Act, however, Congress expressly stated that the law could not infringe on the civil rights of Muslim and Arab Americans.  The NYPD’s actions, even if technically legal, clearly run counter to that sentiment by limiting students’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, the NYPD’s actions undermine the very act that was supposed to protect the country from terrorism. These actions acutely highlight the tension between Constitutional rights and terrorism prevention, and raise important questions about how much infringement American citizens are willing to tolerate.

Photo from: http://hiphopwired.com/2011/10/28/16-nypd-officers-indicted-in-corruption-case/

According to an investigative report (IR) on “Homegrown Terrorism,” issued by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, the U.S. Homeland is the second most dangerous place for a G.I.—second only to outside foreign warzones. The Department of Defense considers violent Islamist extremists—who are penetrating U.S. defenses by enlisting in the U.S. Armed forces—the top threat to these American soldiers. These military personnel have been growing in number and “pose a serious danger to their brothers and sisters in arms who wear the same uniform.” For example, consider the alleged Fort Hood mass murderer, Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan.

The report goes on to list facts and figures of threats, plots and strikes against U.S. military communities since the attack on 9/11 and indicates that there has been a surge of “homegrown terrorism.” The investigation resulted in findings that 70% of the plots against military targets have occurred since 2009.

This report was issued just before a joint House-Senate hearing on Homegrown Terror [held by the House of Homeland Security panel, chaired by Rep. Peter King (R-NY), and its Senate counterpart, chaired by Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)]. Even though King and Lieberman appeared to agree regarding the jihadist threat, the Obama Administration and congressional Democrats appeared to take issue with the premise of the report—especially the information within the report which demonstrates that the people targeting American soldiers were violent Islamist extremists.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton made clear that the Administration wishes to avoid “imprecise terminology that may cause confusion and may unjustifiably give credence to the falsehood… that we are waging a war on Islam.” Stockton reiterated that this threat to military communities was serious and that there is an obligation to keep these men and women safe at home.

House Committee Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS), on the other hand, suggested that the hearing was grounded on stereotyping innocent Muslims, stating that “[a] congressional hearing that identifies one religion as a likely threat within the military is not only inaccurate, but unwise.”

It is difficult to conclude that the committee’s report is simply grounded in anti-Muslim stereotyping when they speak of honoring those Muslim-American heroes who have been killed in action and indicate that some have even been buried at Arlington National Cemetery for “making the ultimate sacrifice in service of our nation.”  However, along with these reverences, “[t]he Committee’s Majority Staff has determined that nine or more Muslim-Americans who are current, former or would-be military insiders have been convicted since 2001 or stand charged with national security crimes. An additional two Muslim-Americans convicted of planning terrorist attacks against military targets inside the U.S. had earlier tried and failed to join police departments or the FBI and CIA.”

The Obama administration’s reluctance to discuss Islam’s role in targeting the military continued even after the report was issued: Watch Here as the Department of Defense refused to acknowledge that al-Qaeda is engaged in violent Islamist extremism. The Obama Administration’s approach to Islamist terror is further illustrated by its handling of the Fort Hood massacre and the June 1, 2009 murder of Private William Long at a Little Rock, Arkansas military recruiting center by a radicalized Muslim. The investigative report indicates that the Administration refuses to say that either of these attacks is evidence of violent Islamist Extremism. As a result, the soldiers were killed and/or wounded have yet to receive Purple Heart medals, despite pleas by their survivors. (IR)

The question thus remains: how do we keep this country’s armed forces safe without targeting innocent Muslim-Americans who truly care about this country? …And not just military personnel, but how do we keep all people within the United States safe? For a country that reveres the phrase “all men are created equal,” it would be difficult to justify that certain people have more rights than others. We all have certain inalienable rights, so how can we single out certain types of individuals without going against those morals and beliefs that this country has been founded on?

Read the U.S. House of Representatives Majority Investigative Report Here.

Photo retrieved from: ticknortribe.blogspot.com/2011/03/fort-hood.html

Government drone use in civilian airspace is currently limited to government agencies that secure a severely restricted waiver, which is granted on a case-by-case basis.  By the end of 2011, the FAA had only approved 300 waivers. However, with the enactment of H.R. 658 it is not difficult to foresee increased government use of drones in civilian airspace in the near future. Already, Customs and Border Patrol anticipates expanding from nine to twenty-four predator drones, which the agency has successfully used to seize over twenty tons of illegal drugs and complete approximately 7,500 arrests along the US border over the past six years. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood recently stated that the Department has considered how civilian drone use could “help meet a number of challenges, from spotting wildfires to assessing natural disasters.”

With widespread use in civilian airspace, we can expect government drone use to present constitutional privacy concerns. The constitution does not prohibit the government from using drones for police surveillance. In fact, it is well established that the constitution permits the police to surveil property- from ground or air- that is within plain view without a warrant. This means that the constitution may allow government drones to hover over private homes without the consent of the homeowner and without a warrant.

One limitation that could prevent improper government drone surveillance is the constitutional requirement that the government secure a warrant to use a surveillance device that is “not in general public use.” However, Jonathan Zittrain, a professor at Harvard Law School recently made a key observation that civilian drone use can determine how the government will be able to use drones in the future.  Chiefly, with the advent of widespread commercial and recreational drone use, it could be difficult to argue that drones are “not in general public use.” The result could mean widespread government drone surveillance as a norm; a circumstance the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) assumes will lead to a surveillance state.

It is often the case in the U.S. that cutting edge technology initially used in the military is ultimately introduced into general public use, e.g., the internet and cellular phones. Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine widespread government use of drones by 2015 – H.R. 658’s mandatory FAA deadline for civilian drone use safety rules. While increases in the governmental use of drones will undoubtedly provide positive crime-fighting results, we can nevertheless expect to see numerous legal challenges that will ultimately determine the extent to which the government can take advantage of this technology in civilian airspace.